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Data first travelled utilising packet switching technology in 1969, between four university network 
nodes in the United States (US) – in the same year that the International Institute of 
Communications (IIC) was founded. In 1971, the US regulator, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), published findings in the form of the Computer Inquiry I.1 The aim of this 
investigation was to promote economic growth and innovation in the computing services market. It 
established a division between regulated ‘pure’ communication services – using computers to run 
communication networks – and unregulated ‘pure data processing’ services using computer power 
at the edges of these networks. The monopoly provider of communication services in the US at the 
time was AT&T, and it was thereby prohibited from directly offering unregulated data processing 
services. Bernie Strassburg, then Chief of the FCC Common Carrier Bureau, had justified the 
exclusion of data processing from traditional communication service regulation in this way:  
‘Few products of modern technology have as much potential for social, economic, and 
cultural benefit as does the multiple access computer. With its huge capacity and versatility 
and in combination with communications – also in the forefront of the technological 
revolution – the computer is a storehouse of virtually untapped new and improved services 
to the public.’2 
Substitute artificial intelligence or algorithm for ‘multiple access computer’ in this quotation and the 
reason often given for maintaining unregulated digital platform companies is similar today – 
regulation will suppress innovation and is not healthy for the economy. By 1980, the aim was to 
ensure that any regulatory regime would not hamper the market conditions that were expected to 
foster ‘information systems [that] can be programmed so that users dictate the nature and extent of 
computer processing applications’.3 In these early days of computerised services, much hope was 
placed in a market evolution in which ‘users’ – consumers or citizens – would have control of their 
digital environment. 
We interact with digital technologies and services today that differ in kind and degree from their 
predecessors, but the challenges for regulators are in some ways not substantially changed.  Modern 
digital platforms are distinguished by their use of digital technologies for binding, coordinating, and 
implementing methods for linking multiple suppliers and consumers or citizens using their data. The 
dominant market positions achieved by Google, Facebook, Amazon and Twitter are echoed by those 
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of Tencent, Alibaba, Baidu or Weibo in the Chinese market. Their market dominance is widely 
attributed to the ‘intelligent’ capabilities of machines; market entry by companies that disrupts older 
‘single sided’ business models; and the scale of globally distributed end-users of platforms. The 
digital platforms enable “datafication” (information circulation and commodification) which 
constitutes the key element of platformisation.4 The dominant platform companies often claim they 
are not providing traditional communications services (and are not publishers) and, thus, they 
should not be subject to communications, media or other forms of regulatory oversight. 
The FCC’s Computer Inquiry I decision was an instance of a regulator aiming to stimulate economic 
growth and innovation in new digital services, and to protect the public interest in traditional (voice) 
communication services. The European Commission’s Specialized Group on Telecommunications in 
1969 already was grappling with the risk that developments in the United States would leave Europe 
behind in the face of the ‘the almost explosive nature of demand for all modes of transmission of 
information especially in the field of telephony’.5 Decisions made at this time sparked controversies 
about what services should be regulated, and now haunt those seeking to govern what has become 
a hugely complex digital ecology. These controversies have yielded different responses in Europe, 
and in other countries and regions, and today, governments in the West are asking what should be 
done when the erosion of boundaries between industries providing communication transport, 
content, and data processing means that the issue of which services should be regulated is once 
again prominent and strongly contested.   
In the 1960s, those committed to safeguarding data-related services from regulation argued that the 
monopoly position of the then traditional communication service providers was not “natural” and 
that their economies of scale were not the most important factor in determining the shape of future 
communication, media and information processing markets. Decisions then, and later, reflected turf 
wars; competing claims to ownership of knowledge underpinning technical innovations; changing 
distributions of economic (and political) power; and shifting perceptions of the need to protect 
consumer and citizen interests. A characteristic of decisions about how and what to regulate over 
time has been the argument that technically induced “natural” monopoly is not sustainable in the 
face of rapid technological innovation, and that monopoly power will ebb away if left to market 
forces. Yet, it has also been argued that the existence of monopoly conditions at a given time does 
not ‘preclude direct, effective competition in an area. They in no way require an enormous 
concentration of ownership and accumulation of monopoly power’. 6 Dominant incumbent 
companies – then the public telecommunication operators and now the largest digital platforms – 
will do their best to slow the pace of new entry to protect their markets. Reducing barriers to entry 
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has provided a rationale for regulatory intervention with the expectation that variety in service 
characteristics and modes of operation will emerge as a result of competition. In the current period, 
the lesson is that the dominance of the large digital platform companies is not determined by the 
nature of their technologies or by market dynamics alone. The presence or absence of effective 
competition is also, and crucially, the outcome of decisions about whether and what to regulate to 
secure the public interest. 
Fifty years ago it was not only traditional communication and computing services that were 
considered in deliberations about what to regulate. Non-economic values and outcomes were also 
high on the agenda, especially regarding media content. In 1970 the Council of Europe issued its 
Declaration on Mass Communication Media and Human Rights, establishing that the ‘right to 
freedom of expression shall apply to mass communication media’ and confirming a right to privacy: 
‘Where regional, national or international computer-data banks are instituted the individual must 
not become completely exposed and transparent by the accumulation of information referring even 
to his private life’ (Art. 19).7 These expectations continue to be central in deliberations about how 
and what to regulate in western societies. 
The history of the spread of the internet and media, communication and computing industry 
convergence from this early period to the present has spawned a proliferation of over-the-top digital 
services and seen the meteoric rise of a small number of dominant platform companies. The 
interests of governments and civil society stakeholders in the digital platform ecology are 
increasingly regarded as misaligned with the platforms’ business models and ambitions for growth. 
Discussion is focusing on behavioural and structural market remedies that can be achieved through 
regulation. What has changed is that the platform companies are continuously seeking to strengthen 
and diversify their revenue streams by exploiting global, as well as regional and national, markets. In 
the international system that facilitates trading relationships, they can organise their operations 
with relatively little regard for national boundaries, although they encounter specific national 
constraints in China and, increasingly, in Western national jurisdictions. In the face of threats of 
regulation, their strategy is to use public relations communications and the courts to deflect 
criticism. In this regard, arguably little has changed from earlier struggles over what and how to 
regulate. When confronted with proposed or implemented changes in laws aimed at curtailing 
platform practices, today’s companies highlight their commitments to public values – ‘Google cares 
deeply about journalism’8 – not unlike AT&T’s slogan used in the early 1980s, when it was 
confronted by the threat of a break-up of its monopoly in the communications market: ‘reach out 
and touch someone (to share good news)’.9  
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Voluntary codes of practice and ethical codes are being developed by the platforms in response to 
calls for public action and threats (and sometimes new forms) of regulation. But the burden of proof 
rests on those who are concerned about the power of platforms to demonstrate that platform self-
regulation is not yielding societal well-being and solidarity. The argument is that, while there is a 
need to stimulate innovation, foster connectivity, build trust, and increase transparency and 
accountability, this should be principally the responsibility of the digital platform companies so as 
not to risk slowing the pace of innovation. Even when the potential for exclusion, inequality and 
harms to democracy or young people are acknowledged, the solution is often said to lie in the 
further development of “smart” technical innovations. 
When pro-active responses to digital platform dominance are considered, the question is whether 
new institutional rules and norms for regulation can be devised to yield the outcomes valued by 
society.10 What criteria should be used to determine whether a new governance set-up should be 
put in place? Regulation by the state, co-regulation by platforms and the state, and various forms of 
independent regulation provide multiple options, but each raises questions about how to ensure 
that clashes among economic and public values do not yield outcomes that are disadvantageous or 
harmful to specific individuals or groups of stakeholders.   
The largest digital platforms no longer operate as a nascent industry and the way digital information 
collection and processing technologies are being used has beneficial, but also harmful, implications 
for society. Throughout history, the resolution of regulatory and accountability issues has been 
central in determining the scope of regulatory intervention in the marketplace. The aim has been to 
ensure that providers of electronic services can pursue their economic goals, while also safeguarding 
public values such as freedom of expression and privacy.  The balance among these values has 
always been contested – as Kant put it, ‘in the kingdom of ends, everything has either a price, or a 
dignity’.11 The platforms’ digital ecologies embrace all these values and it is unsurprising that there is 
turmoil and contestation.  Questions about the moral limits of the market in the platform era are 
essentially about what is needed by way of oversight to strike a balance between the interests of 
large and small players in the market and consumers and citizens. 
In the face of criticism of the dominant platforms, there is much discussion about whether and how 
to impose a legal information fiduciary obligation12 on them, or a duty of care.13 In the UK, a 
Parliamentary Committee has concluded that ‘self-regulation by online platforms which host user-
generated content, including social media platforms, is failing’.14 The dilemma is how to ensure that 
governments do not use the recognition of harms as a justification to give themselves control that 
infringes on people’s rights and freedoms.
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producing tough language and the political will is accumulating to redirect the platforms’ business 
strategies. For instance, a British House of Commons report on disinformation says that ‘companies 
like Facebook should not be allowed to behave like “digital gangsters” in the online world, 
considering themselves to be ahead of and beyond the law’. 15  Behavioural remedies aiming to 
encourage proactive agency on the part of digital platform users include requiring data mobility and 
interoperability standards between platforms; investing in strengthening media and data literacies; 
oversight of platform terms of service; insisting on algorithm transparency; recognition of user rights 
of data ownership and, in some cases, making platform executives legally liable for harmful content. 
Structural remedies are also being considered as the dominant platforms in the Western world come 
to be regarded as the robber barons of the 21st century; an “evil” that has created a ‘road to digital 
serfdom’.16 While acknowledging that the domination of the major digital platforms is not 
guaranteed to last forever, the 2019 UK Digital Competition Expert Panel report also says that 
‘competition for the market cannot be counted on, by itself, to solve the problems associated with 
market tipping and “winner-takes-most”’.17  
Regulatory remedies for platform power arising from “winner-takes-most” market dynamics cannot, 
however, tell us specifically where accountability should rest for protecting freedom of expression 
and privacy. Yet, while multiple initiatives are being discussed to protect citizens from the power of 
the dominant platforms, for the most part, the priority in Western countries continues to be 
promoting economic growth and technology innovation. There is still a strong tendency to accept 
that today’s monopolistic, dominant digital platforms are the inevitable outcome of a particular 
configuration of modular technologies. This means that the preservation of social values and human 
dignity in the face of platform power (and biased algorithms) is often downplayed in favour of a 
competitive race towards investment in innovative technologies, including artificial intelligence and 
machine learning. What can be priced, quantified and calculated in the marketplace is too often 
being privileged over social values, even as policy makers struggle with the question of what and 
how to regulate. 
In the face of what many see as an information crisis, where individuals are seen as vulnerable to 
misinformation, easily nudged and manipulated, and lacking in critical media literacy,18 the digital 
platform operators continue to be encouraged to develop what amounts to a pervasive culture of 
surveillance that is inconsistent with public values of fairness, solidarity, accountability and 
democracy.19 When there are calls – as in the British Government’s Online Harms White Paper - for a 
new regulatory institution to curtail platform power, proposals emphasise a proportionate 
approach, with action rightly requiring evidence of the severity of harms and assessments of the 
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expected impacts on the platforms’ behaviour. Even if there are some successes in securing the 
independence of any new regulatory institution, and in achieving greater transparency of the 
dominant platforms’ operations,20 most proposals still seem intent on fostering a platform logic of 
intense datafication. They do not, so far, make inroads in tackling the underlying logic of 
datafication; a logic based on subliminal influence and attitude change on a mass, but highly 
individualized, scale. If this logic is to be tackled, it will require a regulatory regime that works as a 
counterpoint to these datafication practices. It will require open debate about the moral limits of 
digital platform markets which challenges the idea that the configuration of digital platforms and 
their business models are “natural”.  
If changes are implemented and enforced through a regulatory framework, this will influence 
investment in the digital infrastructure and the platforms’ business strategies. The struggle today, as 
in the past, is over how to stimulate competition and, at the same time, assure citizen safety, 
security, privacy and freedom of expression. As in earlier eras, the information and communication 
environment favoured by the dominant companies has the potential to be both empowering and 
disempowering. Today’s digital technological system is shaping how we work, shop, learn and play 
and it is enabling how we build, organise, co-ordinate, and deliberate upon our futures – every 
citizen has a stake in the future that is being constructed. The digital platforms’ decisions can 
reinforce or construct new systems of hierarchical control and divisions of labour that enrich the 
choices and material welfare of a few at the expense of others, or their digital systems can be 
developed consistent with the values of equity and justice embodied in rights to privacy and 
freedom of expression and responsibilities to protect them. The form that the digital ecology takes 
in the future will be shaped by governance arrangements – public and private –  as it has been in the 
past.  
Whatever the choices made to give new mandates to regulatory institutions, it is essential to be able 
to evaluate whether the claims made by the dominant platform companies are empty promises or 
crude approximations of more profound transformations that lie ahead. Establishing and enforcing 
an accountability framework is the most important step toward refining and innovating in the 
processes of governing these platforms. When we do not know specifically how the digital ecology is 
failing to meet society’s aspirations, we are ill-prepared to enhance it benefits; re-direct it from 
misguided paths; or mitigate its negative consequences. Good governance involves the recognition 
of rights and the acceptance of responsibilities; and controversy will persist about whether 
developments in digital platform technologies and services should be mainly market-led or if they 
should be subject to regulation. Controversy will also persist about whether the explosion in the 
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quantity of digital information, and in the capacity to communicate across time and space, are 
producing a more knowledgeable, equitable and desirable society.  
As the boundaries between technologies and industry segments change, the potential for the 
exercise of harmful market power will continue to change. Fifty years on from today, there will still 
be a responsibility for representing the public interest in a healthy economy, and in safeguarding 
citizen’s fundamental rights. The myth is that the digital platform companies have been virtually 
unregulated or self-regulated. Yet, although traditional forms of communications and media 
regulation have not applied (as a matter of choice), the platforms are subject to a considerable 
number of legislative conditions – with regard to commerce, data protection and more. These have 
governed or “regulated” their performance to date. The issue, then, is not whether the digital 
platforms should be regulated, it is how institutional arrangements can be altered to better reflect 
societal norms and values so that new conditions shape the platforms’ priorities and business 
practices. 
Looking forward, interests in enhancing security and safety to guard against platforms’ and users’ 
activities that are illegal or disapproved of will continue to struggle against interests defending the 
fundamental right to be free from surveillance and the right to freedom-of-expression. There will be 
a need for codes of conduct with respect to individual and collective issues, and for standards 
appropriate to locally, nationally, regionally and globally bounded environments. There also will be a 
continuing need for competition policy in the wake of consolidating market power and for 
overcoming coordination problems in monitoring digital platform operations, as there was in the 
past.  
In these respects, history could be said to be repeating itself. Yet, there is a difference. This difference 
is that today there are many signs, not all well-founded in evidence, that the combination of changes 
in the digital world, and in the everyday off-line world, are destabilising what have come to be more-
or-less taken for granted norms concerning how human beings get on together; how social relations 
are constituted; and how trust and respect for others are fostered in Western societies. In this sense, 
history is not repeating itself and decision makers sit at a new critical juncture. We may look back 
from the future and see that regulatory inaction, or ineffective regulation, has helped to foster 
incivility, inequality, and dissension in our societies. This will happen if decisions to encourage 
participation in a digital ecology are led predominantly by a collective fascination with the 
potentialities of data and data-processing technology. If, in contrast, such decision are led by the 
norms and controls consistent with information systems that sustain human beings, and their dignity, 
there may be a chance to sustain an inclusive and beneficial social order.    
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